“A note on the forums” by Ilya Ponomarev, Chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Republic, Coordinator of the Political Center of the Legion “Freedom of Russia” and the National Republican Army  on American political analysts' reflections on Russia's war against Ukraine, its causes, possible endings and consequences

The other day I attended an event led by Christopher Chivvis at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. There was a discussion between well-known and respected experts on Russia and international security Andrew Weiss of Carnegie and Fiona Hill of Brookings. The conversation was quite profound. A few things were said, which I think I need to comment on because they brought up some common, and often dangerous, stereotypes that are now widespread in the capital of the free world.

From the very beginning of the conversation, Dr. Weiss urged to abstract from what Russia is like inside today and not to think about what it will be like in the future. “We should be in the business of containing Russia. This is much more important than trying to understand and influence its internal situation,” he said. That is, in essence, not thinking about what motivates Putin in waging wars, and not trying to analyze the factors that lead to the modern-day aggression and imperialism. But how do you treat a disease without understanding its nature, fighting the symptoms (and war itself, of course, is a consequence, not a cause) without trying to eliminate the source?

Of course, this contradiction immediately led to a significant mistake. It was said that “the stalemate in Ukraine is a defeat for Putin.” I don't think so. I actually think right the opposite. Preservation of the current status quo for him is a way to retain his power, his money, and to emerge with dignity from a war he cannot win. The defeat was the failure to take Kyiv and Kharkiv, and the loss of Kherson, which had already been taken. After that, Putin's main task in Ukraine was to somehow settle, as they say in Moscow, “the situation on the ground.” Therefore, a long-term ceasefire along the existing front line in Ukraine is an achievement that Putin can quite easily “sell” to the Russian people as fulfillment of the original objectives of the “special operation” - “Donbass has been defended, Russians in Novorossiya have been protected, a land corridor and water to Crimea have been broken through, many nazis perished, and we didn't need anything else.”

Moreover, a transition to deterrence as a result of a cessation of hostilities would not work in the interests of the Baltic States, Europe, or the rest of the world. This, in fact, was pointed out at this dialog, but somehow very carefully, so as not to come to undesirable but surface-level conclusions that are obvious to such experienced experts of the post-Soviet space. They themselves several times emphasized the role of Putinism in strengthening the global “Axis of Evil” (or, as Weiss humorously called it, “the Axis of Jerks,” the term somewhat reducing the danger emanating from it). This Axis, consisting of North Korea, China, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, plus their satellites, is now growing and strengthening, largely through trade with Russia (“natural resources in exchange for drones and shells”). Moreover, we can safely say that its growth has accelerated dramatically since the start of large-scale hostilities against Ukraine in 2022. So the proposed “containment” reminds too much of the containment of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The Baltic States and Poland are already preparing for the quite predictable complications in not-so-distant future, while in Washington they still prefer stalemate over checkmate...

The discussion (and this distinguished it from other events in the American capital where people prefer to skirt the issue) touched quite a sensitive issue – on how the end of the war could lead to political change in Russia.

The usual consensus is that if the Kremlin loses in Ukraine, it will face a serious trouble. I think this theorem needs to be proved - it is not obvious. There have been instances of regimes that have been mothballed after heavy but incomplete military defeats (e.g. Desert Storm, which left Saddam Hussein in power), after which they even increased their repressiveness without changing their leader, and as a result the cost of change only increased. There have also been examples of reactionary changes of power, further tightening of regimes. More often, of course, there is liberalization, partial or complete dismantling of the existing authoritarian model. But even in latter case the question is open - who can and will replace Putin in Russia?

In the course of the discussion, a fairly widespread opinion of Washingtonians was expressed – that it would be very acceptable and even desirable for the West if “technocrats,” many of whom are now in the current government and led by PM Mikhail Mishustin, would come to power in Russia. This is understandable – these people are known, understandable, and “definitely better than Putin.” There is only one small question: if this idea materializes, who will pay for the restoration of Ukraine? These guys certainly won't. None of them will change the system, much less punish those responsible for unleashing the war. Therefore, all the costs will fall on the shoulders of Western taxpayers, and without going through the procedure of denazification like in post-WWII Germany we will be doomed to repeat all this current horror.

The end of the war without an unambiguous victory of Ukraine and the West will lead to a huge devastated country in the east of the European Union with a large number of temporarily displaced persons, broken families, destroyed businesses, poverty and imminent streams of refugees that will spread across the European continent. Do we want that to happen?

Despite that this discussion did raise the issue of political change in Russia, it was immediately said that “of course we do not want to call for revolution in Moscow. We have no moral right at all to engage in political change in other countries.” I won't bore the reader with countless examples of the U.S. doing the opposite in different parts of the world. And I personally cannot agree more with the idea that one country should not dictate its will to the citizens of another country on how to live their lives and build their statehood. With one exception, and that is a war situation. If one country blatantly violates the UN Charter, unleashes aggression, kills hundreds of thousands of its own and others' citizens, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of others to help the victims of violence and intervene.

During the discussion we recalled the Venezuelan opposition leader Guaido, who was actively supported by the United States. And the speakers, despite the controversy, remembered him as a positive example, although I, for one, think that the idea of promoting him was doomed to fail from the beginning. However, he was recognized as the alternative leader of Venezuela by many countries, and with similar support, the Russian resistance could have drawn many members of the Russian elite to its side, which would have put an end to the war much sooner.

Curiously enough, while we debate about the acceptability of the regime change concept, Russia is quite actively engaged in making political changes in the Western societies. Not so long ago it was direct brutal collusion – hacking, spreading kompromat, running campaigns of internal political destabilization and swaying protest actions, and sometimes outright bribery and espionage. Today, however, Moscow, having been rebuffed, is using more subtle methods to spread disinformation in the Western media, relying on left and right-wing radicals, marginalized politicians, celebrities, and journalists – the kind with peculiar reputations but large audiences.

We do not need to go too far looking for examples. Just note the current course of elections in the United States. If anyone thinks that Putin has given up trying to influence the domestic American political process, go to two recent interviews by Tucker Carlson. An interview with Putin himself and an interview with Russian “philosopher” Aleksandr Dugin, who openly calls himself a fascist and ideologue of the current war with Ukraine. Yevgeny Prigozhin is dead, but his “troll factories” continue to operate in the American (and not only) segment of the Internet.

It should be said that similar troll factories, only working against the Kremlin, were created by two Russian opposition groups (Natalia Arno's Free Russia Foundation and Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation) with NED funding. So why can't we use this precedent to build a system of measures aimed at fighting Putinism as a modern version of fascism, and not limit ourselves to human rights initiatives and counter-propaganda sites, trying to mitigate just some of the ugliest consequences of Russia’s dictatorship actions?

Finally, on a separate but no less important topic, raised by Fiona Hill – the issue of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. The international document (signed but never ratified) under which Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons to Russia and disarmed in exchange for security guarantees. And the one that was not honored, even though it should have been more than a decade ago – back in 2014, when the annexation of Crimea triggered the Russian war against Ukraine.

Now, in fact, Putin is giving the West a chance to restore the honor and enforce the promised security guarantees. Military aid to Ukraine is not charity, but the fulfillment of a valid treaty. And this is probably the most important thing that the speakers of the event said: “if the Budapest Memorandum is not enforced, it will be a clear signal to the whole world: the nuclear non-proliferation regime is not working, and every country should strive to acquire nuclear weapons for itself. Only nuclear status provides a guarantee of security.”

In fact, the world is now standing at a fork: whether to confirm Orwell's prediction that in international relations “all animals are equal, but there are some that are more equal than others,” or to insist that the rules are the same for all. If we think that terms like “legitimate spheres of influence,” “the impossibility of defeating a nuclear power,” and “Russia and democracy are incompatible” are OK, then yes, let's engage in containment and leave Putin alone. If not, let’s stop arguing and go to action – the sooner we remove the Kremlin dictator from his office, the sooner peace will come.