The current Russian regime under Vladimir Putin represents a significant threat to the stability and security of the United States and the broader Western world.

This memo outlines a comprehensive approach to neutralizing these threats, focusing on facilitating regime change in Russia to advance U.S. national security interests and global stability. Additionally, it considers the geopolitical dividends of such a strategy, including weakening adversaries like China and Iran.

The subject of changing the political regime in Russia is now strictly off-limits in many Western countries, not only for official figures but also for most analytical centers. This occurs despite repeated calls from Russian opposition figures and Ukrainian officials for the need for dialogue on possible scenarios for political transformation in the Russian Federation and the post-war security arrangements in Europe.

Those politicians and even representatives of the Russian opposition who speak about the necessity of removing Putin from power, and even more so those who take practical steps in this direction, are blocked from cooperating with international democracy promotion institutions, and even more so with government bodies. These rules have been actively established, primarily by the Biden Administration in the United States (represented by Bill Burns and Jake Sullivan), as well as by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (despite a different position from his ministers Baerbock and Pistorius). Countries that were ready to take a more active stance on this issue (such as Poland) were warned against engaging in "dangerous games." Even Ukraine, for which the issue of changing power in the Kremlin is a matter of survival, found that the provision of American military assistance was directly linked to the inadmissibility of attempts to destabilize Putin's regime. The outcome of the elections in the United States raises the question of whether altering this approach is appropriate to achieve the strategic goals of the collective West.

It is important to understand the position of those opposed to the idea of engaging the political changes in Russia. Most of them are not fans of President Putin, but nevertheless effectively work to maintain his power.

There are several of their arguments:

- The change of power in Russia carries much more risks than benefits. Among the risks, the following are usually highlighted: The possibility of Putin unleashing a nuclear war against the West if the threat to his power becomes too great.

- Chaos within Russia, loss of control over the nuclear arsenal, and violation of the non-proliferation regime (as well as new opportunities for international terrorism), along with a humanitarian catastrophe in the event of a civil war.

- There is no reason to be confident that a new government would be better than the current one. It could continue (at best) the historical tradition of imperial authoritarian power from Moscow, or (at worst) become an even more aggressive fascist regime led by Putin's successors, among them warlords who have facilitated violence and engaged in war crimes in Ukraine and are armed with nuclear warheads.

- There is no alternative: the democratic opposition is weak and fragmented, lacking significant political strength, mass public support, a vision for the future, governing experience, and a plan or means to come to power. In this situation, there are no grounds to expect a positive change within a single political cycle of Western governments.

- The experience of the West (primarily the United States) in participating in regime changes in other countries is generally negative: either nothing was achieved (for example, in Venezuela or Cuba), or it ended with significant costs and no less significant political damage (for example, in Iraq or Afghanistan).

- Russia's fate should not concern America at all: it is a regional power that has gone far beyond its pay grade – therefore, its containment should just be made more effective, and let Europeans deal with it on their own. The real problem for the U.S. is China, and the only thing that should interest the Western world is how to prevent Beijing from gaining additional competitive advantages through access to cheap Russian resources (natural, intellectual, technological, etc.).

Let's examine these arguments in detail:

- Why the topic of political change in Russia should interest the U.S.: - Addressing the China issue (as well as many problems in the Middle East) is much more expensive and complex in the context of a stable "axis of evil" alliance between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (and in reality, we should be prepared for an even more dangerous possible transformation of the BRICS association into a military-political alliance competing with NATO under Chinese guidance). A destabilized Russian regime would undermine the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, forcing China to divert resources and attention to secure its northern border and alternative energy sources. The collapse of Russian support would isolate Tehran, limiting its access to advanced weaponry and strategic alliances, thereby reducing its capacity to threaten U.S. allies in the Middle East.

The current power in the Kremlin cannot be bought off away from Beijing due to Putin's lack of trust in the West. The maximum that can be achieved is a weakening of the ties with Iran (the agreement signed on January 18th with Tehran should be seen as a mere challenge to Washington to negotiate). The only way to detach Russia from China is through political change in Moscow.

- Putin will not stop at Ukraine. The militarization of the Russian economy and the increased military force, which is difficult to demobilize without creating serious social-political problems, will prevent the Kremlin leader from exiting a state of war for a long time. The Baltic states, Poland, or Kazakhstan (not to mention new adventures in Africa and the Middle East, and possibly in Venezuela) are questions of the not-so-distant future: war and instability will be exported from Moscow worldwide.

  - Moscow’s objective is not territorial expansion but a revision of the entire system of international relations that the U.S. and its allies have built over decades.

- Realistic ways to influence the situation in Russia. The revolutionary opposition movement in Russia is weak and lacks media, organizational, and financial resources. Many became dependent on grant financing put by the former Administration (and thus – impotent and compromised). The moment for overturning the situation from within was missed at the onset of large-scale aggression in 2022; the elites have already adapted to the sanctions and are in a waiting mode for the outcome of peace negotiations and a return to "normalcy". However, there are several opportunities and prerequisites to awaken internal political processes in the country:

- There is still no quality television, alternative to the official one, that encompasses the entire range of content types actively used by the Kremlin (news, films, shows, music, etc.). At the same time, the number of Russian opinion leaders in the West (journalists, actors, writers, musicians, etc.) has sharply increased. American and European democracy foundations are cautiously backing various opposition media projects, but, firstly, the resources are scattered, and secondly, they are focused solely on news projects, which do not attract mass consumers and do not allow the opposition to break out of the informational ghetto.

  - The fairly effective methods of filtering opposition content established by the Kremlin may soon be overcome through new mobile communication technology via the Starlink system. Certain decisions made by U.S. tech giants (Google, Facebook, etc.) actually hindered the dissemination of opposition content on their platforms in Russia. This situation can and should be changed as part of a coordinated policy.

  - The Russian opposition (for a good reason) is not taken seriously, which sharply narrows its support base—no one wants to associate with losers and downed pilots. The West is passively waiting for key figures in the diaspora to consolidate while they actively compete with each other for influence and resources for survival. Instead of standing by, it is necessary to create a coordination platform from the outside, the very existence of which will immediately compel the main groups to sit together at one table. This will significantly enhance their effectiveness in influencing the broader population.

  - Alongside the creation of tools to influence Russian citizens (primarily in the capital and major cities), it is necessary to increase the likelihood of an intra-elite conspiracy against the Kremlin leadership, which brought unnecessary troubles (both personal security and loss of business due to sanctions, war, and property redistribution) and life inconveniences for the business community and ruling bureaucracy, effectively holding them hostage and creating a "golden cage" in Moscow. To do this, it is necessary to demonstrate the possibility of breaking free from Putin’s grip, obtaining protection (personal and financial) in the West, and escaping from sanction pressure—in exchange for active actions to overthrow the oppressing troublemaking regime. The simplest way for this is to publicly empower opposition groups with a mandate to conduct negotiations and demonstrate several success stories; this will be sufficient to shatter the atmosphere of "we are all in the same boat," provoke suspicion, achieve a split among the elites, and encourage certain groups to finally take action.

Risk assessment and ways to minimize them:

- It is worth recalling that before the collapse of the USSR, the American elite was concerned about the same risks, and actively opposed the changes. None of those risks materialized, despite the much greater effectiveness of the Soviet state and its institutions: the Communist Party, KGB, and army.

- Any preparation by Putin for the real use of nuclear weapons will show his inner circle that there are no other means of defense left, and the regime stands at the last frontier. This will sharply increase the likelihood of a change of power from within, and Putin understands this well. Bluffing and threats to the West are way more effective tools for the Russian ruler than their actual implementation. This allows him to maintain a certain level of influence and intimidation both domestically and internationally.

- The likelihood of Russia's collapse, while actually quite low, should not be ignored. Delaying addressing this issue is likely to increase risks rather than decrease them. If someone in a decision-making position views the consequences of a collapse as a serious threat, they should act as soon as possible to minimize potential negative outcomes.

- The modern Kremlin regime is indeed Bonapartist in nature, as it is inextricably linked to Putin himself. Unlike the Soviet system, where institutions of power played a significant role, this role has been virtually eliminated in today’s Russia. It is a system of manual control taken to its maximum. The main factor of its stability is not ideology or stable rules, but rather corrupt interests. The system is sustained by the distribution of natural resource rent and budgetary flows. Since this system cannot exist without Putin, and he is mortal, the entire range of risks associated with a change of power will inevitably materialize one day. Therefore, it is important to strive for these changes to occur in a predictable and manageable manner, rather than becoming an unpleasant surprise in the not-so-distant future.

The Russian regime’s actions pose a clear and present danger to U.S. national security and the global order. By implementing a strategy centered on weakening Putin’s regime through military, economic, and diplomatic measures, the United States can secure its interests, promote democracy, and reshape the global balance of power in its favor. A coordinated effort to leverage the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, coupled with robust support for Russian opposition movements, offers the most viable path to achieving these objectives.

Demonstrating the effectiveness of U.S.-led coalitions in addressing authoritarian threats will solidify transatlantic unity and deter future aggressors. U.S. actions should be framed as a defense of global democracy and stability. Regime change in Russia is not an act of aggression but a response to its continued violations of international norms. Democratic Russia as a potential NATO member and a constructive global partner can provide long-term benefits for the United States and the Western world.

This strategy will not only neutralize the immediate threats posed by Russia but also deliver significant geopolitical dividends, including the containment of China and Iran and the strengthening of the Western alliance system.