The series of changes of national governments around the world to those with more moderate positions on the Russian-Ukrainian war (already occurred in Slovakia and the UK, in process in France, quite probable in the near future in the USA, Lithuania and the Czech Republic) raises the question: what should be the optimal strategy of Ukraine and the Rammstein coalition supporting it with regard to the scenarios of how to end the hostilities?

The author of these lines remains convinced that the war can be ended and a long-term stable peace can be established only through the dismantling of Putinism as a political system and the removal of its key players from power. It is this event that will lead to the de-occupation of all internationally recognized Ukrainian territory; the cost of their return by purely military means now seems prohibitively high for the Ukrainian nation. 

Whether regime change in Moscow will occur as a result of the Kremlin's military loss in Ukraine (e.g., the liberation of Crimea), an internal elite coup, or a popular uprising is an open question and is beyond the scope of this article. We better get ready for what to do in the morning after, and during the time before it happens.

In this text, let us consider possible allies’ strategies to stop at least the active phase of hostilities.

Strategy 1 - “Victory”. Complete defeat of the aggressor, restoration of internationally recognized borders of Ukraine and ensuring (at least) compensation for losses and punishment of those responsible for unleashing the war. 

As it was said above, it is impossible to accomplish this task without eliminating Putin, preventing the "evolutionary" transfer of power to his heirs (including relatively moderate ones), and dismantling the political system created by him. Therefore, the choice of this strategy cannot be made without readiness to implement military-political steps on the territory of the Russian Federation. There is also a strong need for a comprehensive program of neutralization and conversion to the side of allies of a certain part of the Russian elites (with the help of sanctions and other methods of "stick and carrot").

Strategy 2 - “Stalemate”. Indefinite continuation of the war of attrition, which Ukraine is now forced to wage in the situation of the West's unreadiness to commit to the implementation of strategy No. 1. 

At the moment, there is no reason to anticipate successful combat operations in the near future leading to a strategic breakthrough by either side of the conflict (unless there is a leap beyond the existing theaters of military operations, for example, to the territory of the Russian Federation or involvement of Belarus in the hostilities). Both sides are now making up for personnel losses (Ukraine loses three to five times fewer people, but Russia retains the ability to recruit residents of financially disadvantaged territories to the front with the help of significant cash injections). 

The most alarming situation is with weapons - Russia has a noticeable superiority in the air, in long-range missile systems, in shells, and this superiority is rather increasing. Ukraine has the ability to use more effective Western weaponry, but it is quantitatively lacking. Also, Ukraine's power generation has been slashed by half in 2024, as the deliveries of air defense systems were critically late. 

Therefore, regrettably, we should say that if the West does not dramatically increase military production to defeat the aggressor and is unable to make large-scale deliveries of electricity to Ukraine, Moscow will win the war of attrition. In any case, the situation should not be left to its own devices; delay in making decisions is not in the interests of the allies.

Strategy 3 - “Negotiations”. Securing the most favorable negotiating position with the current Russian regime in order to reach a certain compromise - so that as a result of negotiations the Russian side would be forced to agree that Ukraine would regain its sovereignty over the maximum of its legitimate territories, as well as receive guarantees of the impossibility of a repeated attack, while Putin will have an option to save his face at home.

De facto, the West is now implementing this very strategy, although it has a number of fundamental flaws:

• Concluding some kind of “peace agreement” with Putin's current regime is only possible if he has the ability to declare this agreement a victory. At the same time perception of Putin's scoring a victory inside the country means even more strengthening of his authoritarian regime, which, in the situation of militarization of the economy and mobilization of the army, will be doomed to a new escalation in the near future, most likely a confrontation with one of the neighboring NATO countries (prime candidates are Baltic States and Poland);

• The unfinished nature of the conflict will lead to the need to finance the restoration of Ukrainian infrastructure with international aid, i.e. Western taxpayers' money, instead of the Russian budget, which should have been the main donor in case of a full-fledged defeat of Putinism;

• A deal with the aggressor, declaring a de facto partial recognition of its claims, is a green light to other potential spoilers of the world order, first of all - a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan;

• Ukrainian society can agree to a compromise that would contain genuine guarantees of the country's integration into the global security system, joining NATO and the European Union, and at the very least - the establishment of an air shield over the entire territory of Ukraine. The absence of such a solution will be perceived as akin to the Munich Betrayal of 1938, and will most likely lead to internal political destabilization of Ukraine, with the main beneficiary being the same Putin.

Still let us analyze the possible negotiating positions of the parties in hypothetical negotiations. 

Moscow's starting negotiations position was recently declared by Putin: Ukraine completely withdraws from the territory of its Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions, abandons its attempts to regain Crimea, reduces its army to 350,000 people, accepts restrictions on a number of long-range weapons, and refuses to join NATO.

Ukraine's starting position is also well known: complete de-occupation of the country's territory and a return to the pre-2014 borders while receiving full international security guarantees, compensation for the damage caused to it and punishment of the perpetrators of the war.

Intermediate options announced by the numerous individual politicians or states, ranked from the more acceptable for Ukraine to the most desirable for Putin:

a) “Appeasing capitulation”: de-occupation of mainland Ukraine with certain guarantees for the separatists (e.g., amnesty to the military men, status of the Russian language) and the establishment of some kind of special regime for Crimea (a transitional period for de-occupation, either deferred status, joint administration, or partition of the region to Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea);

b) “Istanbul”: continued occupation of the Russian-controlled territories of Donbass and Crimea, with de-occupation of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions (possibly except for a narrow land corridor to Crimea), neutral status and disarmament of Ukraine (more or less along the lines of the unsigned "Istanbul Agreements" discussed back in 2022);

c) “A swap”: Ukraine withdraws completely from Donbass (the so-called DNR and LNR) and gives up Crimea, while Russia returns control of the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions to it;

d) “Minsk-3”: a ceasefire along the current front line with the continued occupation of ~20% of Ukraine's territory and the start of lengthy settlement negotiations (analogous to the infamous Minsk agreements);

In all likelihood, if any of these options will be considered by Ukraine, it will be only a temporary solution, as the country is clearly not ready to give up its territories. On the other hand, any scenario with de-occupation of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions would pose a certain legal problem for Putin, as it would require amendments to the current Russian Constitution, which would contradict the idea of declaring himself the "winner".

Obviously, both Putin and Ukraine will be forced politically to adhere publicly to their maximum demands. Additionally, being de facto in “stalemate” strategy 2, Russia speaks about the desire to negotiate (strategy 3), and Ukraine - declares its readiness to fight tooth and nail until the ultimate victory (strategy 1). Western partners, while declaring support for any choice made by Kiev, are stealthily tilting the situation towards “negotiations” strategy 3.

However, key Ukraine’s allies, if negotiations begin, will inevitably assume some arrangement that would seem to be acceptable, and lead the matter towards it. The wrong choice of goal will lead either to the impossibility to reach an agreement or to unnecessary losses, a true crime after all the sacrifices Ukraine has made. It is especially relevant to have a common agreed position on the boundaries of possible compromises in light of the numerous statements by one of the viable candidates in the U.S. elections about his willingness to sit down at the negotiating table with Putin the very day after his election.

The "Minsk-3" option is very tempting with its simplicity, and there are concerns that some politicians in the West will want to push away from it, without understanding that this is what Putin would like to achieve now. The option of an "appeasing capitulation" is good because it aligned closely with Ukraine's main goal in this war, and that’s exactly the reason why it is unclear how to make Moscow agree to it. The "Istanbul" option is much more likely, as it has already been discussed before and both sides have leaned towards accepting it. Finally, the "swap" option is a truly unpleasant compromise for both sides, who will be forced to make difficult decisions from the perspective of their domestic interests.

But we should understand that any of these options are only a respite. It is always uncomfortable to be the "warmonger," much more pleasant to be a "peacemaker." About 85 years ago, in 1938, one respectable gentleman from Britain “brought peace” to the West through negotiations with Hitler amid thunderous applause. And another gentleman, a bitter and not entirely handshake-friendly marginal and alcoholic, called for blood, sweat, and tears, and referred to those peace agreements as a shame. In the end, the second gentleman, Winston Churchill, had to lead his country, but by then, war had knocked on the doors of the West. He ultimately did everything to win. And then, to avoid new shameful temptations, he made every effort to create a strong Euro-Atlantic security system. It withstood the Cold War but has significantly degraded in the neoliberal era after the collapse of the USSR.

Today, I feel that more and more Western politicians are calling us once again to stop the war with shame. They label representatives of the Russian armed resistance, those who call for the elimination of the modern reincarnation of fascism, the origin of the war - Putinism - as radicals and individuals especially dangerous in the nuclear age. We understand that only the wise learn from others' mistakes, while the rest must inevitably make their own. I believe that in the end, they will force Ukraine to make some questionable deal with the aggressor and significantly increase with that the probability of a war between Russia and Europe - just as the Munich Agreement paved the way to the invasion of Poland.

We should continue to advocate for two things: firstly, to choose a compromise that is not too shameful (at least like the "Istanbul" option), and secondly, to change our mindset and not forget that the respite will be short-lived. We need to actively work towards eliminating Putin while also strengthening the defense of NATO's eastern borders. If the former does not happen, for the latter two percent of the defense budget, alas, will not be enough.