There is a lot of talk right now about how to achieve long-term sustainable peace in Europe. The U.S. House of Representatives, having recently passed a financial assistance bill, has demanded that the current Administration provided it with a concrete plan within 45 days (i.e., during the first week of June) on how exactly the world is going to help Ukraine not just withstand aggression, but to win the war. As Sun Tzu once suggested “victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek [the way] to win.” The situation in the world today is not new. During World War II, Western public opinion went through the same evolution from illusions about appeasement of the aggressor and the possibility of not interfering and remaining neutral to Nazi Germany, all the way to demands to crush the scum. All this has already happened in our joint not so distant history

Putin, as many experts have rightfully suggested, is a gangster, and has the personality of a bully. It was in his childhood when he learned a simple recipe to score a victory: never negotiate but dictate your will, hit first, demonstrate your readiness to go all the way and lack of fear. He applied this approach both in 2014 and 2022 in Ukraine. Ukraine was trying to negotiate in 2014 and lost Crimea and Donbass for that reason; it took the fight in 2022 and performed miraculously well, liberating some of the already occupied land. The West opted for the path of “dialogue”, and the result was the missed opportunity to destroy the aggressor in 2022-23. Now we should clearly state that the possibility of solving the problem with just military force was missed.

Moreover, we are coming to the limit of mobilization resources in Ukraine; Western military production output and financial assistance also significantly lags the demand, while Russia can still bring up to a million and more recruits to front, as well as increasingly finance its war efforts in the foreseeable future, and even enjoy the current economic growth that was generated by a war economy.

An asymmetrical, more efficient response is needed from the world. How to tap into resources not yet engaged? How to learn from the mistakes made and avoid their repetition in the future? How to use discovered weaknesses, widen the cracks instead of continuously hitting Russia at its strong points? But most importantly – how to make the enemy believe we will not get tired one day and just agree to his demands?

The first step is learning from our experience and making global efforts and spending coherent and efficient. We need to establish a joint decisive geopolitical command of the allied nations (probably under Ukrainian leadership), Allied Victory Headquarters. It may sound pompous and excessive, but despite Putin constantly repeated publicly (and could even personally believe in his claims) that Russia is fighting not against just Ukraine, but against NATO, the USA, a global conspiracy, only few believe in this. Everyone rather sees that Ukraine is fighting, and the West is helping it, but not as a side of the conflict. And it is also visible that war fatigue is growing in both Europe and America. The possibility of defeating the entire Western world looks even less probable than defeating Russia; but defeating Ukraine for many seems far more feasible.

This perception not only prolongs the war but also creates risks for countries neighboring Russia (primarily Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland), fostering the illusion that they too can be defeated individually, while NATO would merely resort to supply some ammunition and express concerns.

Putin has already converted the Russian economy to military rails. Like Hitler in 1930s, he cannot deescalate in future without facing dramatic pushback in his constituency. It will come from those armed people of lumpen background and with fighting experience, who are now earning big bucks in Ukraine. But it will also be expressed by elites, who are disenfranchised with the West already and if hostilities will stop will neither return to the Cote d’Azur villas nor continue to benefit from military procurement and property redistribution inside Russia. So, like during WWII, a comprehensive global anti-fascist alliance, which should include Russians fighting against Putinism, is essential to demonstrate leadership and dispel illusions among all opposing sides: this war will not end by itself; the forces of good will no matter what must triumph over the forces of evil, restoring peace and order in Europe and beyond.

Speaking of how to get to this objective, many people are mindful of Zelenskyy's "peace formula," which is made of these ten points aimed at stopping the war:

Ensure nuclear safety of facilities in Ukraine;

Stop violating the food security of Ukraine and of the countries- consumer of Ukrainian food exports;

Cancel the destruction of Ukraine's energy infrastructure and ensure energy security;

Release all prisoners and deportees;

Fulfill the requirements of the UN Charter in terms of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine and, more broadly, the global security; Withdraw Russian troops and stop hostilities;

Restore justice, i.e. extradite the perpetrators of aggression to the international tribunal and compensate for the damage caused to Ukraine; Implement a counteraction to ecocide;

Provide security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent a new escalation in the future;

Document the end of the war.

It is not hard to see that all these points are what Russia is requested to do. And it makes sense that if these ten steps are actually taken, peace will come.

There is only one question. Is it realistic for Putin to agree to these steps? After all, their implementation makes completely meaningless the criminal war that his regime was waging before. And what if he does not take these ten steps? How can the Kremlin be forced to go along with this program? There is no answer to that.

More and more Ukrainian citizens and politicians in the West are asking another simple question: where is the action plan to force Russia to peace? If not according to full Zelenskyy's formula, then at least by going straight to point number 10. Alas, there is no such plan for one simple reason: it is impossible to force Putin's regime to end this war on any terms acceptable to Ukraine. No compromise is seen. It would be suicide either for Putin or for Zelenskyy, or for both.

Yes, Moscow would probably agree to a suspension of hostilities along the front line that now runs through Ukraine. But precisely to a suspension, to a truce, to a temporary fixation of the status quo in order to regroup, build up its forces and bring to completion "the final solution to the Ukrainian question," as the ideological associates of the current Russian government from Nazi Germany would have said. That is why the question of establishing long-term and stable peace in Ukraine (and more broadly - in the entire post-Soviet space and the entire European continent) is inextricably linked to the question of regime change in Russia, the final destruction of modern-day fascism -Putinism – as both a system of power and inhumane values.

Let's think about steps that need to be taken for such a peace to be established.

Step 1. Providing enough weapons for Ukraine and unlocking the possibility to use them

The paramount importance is to provide Ukraine with an adequate number of modern weapons. As one of the prominent NATO generals correctly said, "if one side shoots at another and the other side cannot shoot back, the latter will lose." It is certainly necessary to provide the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) with the necessary equipment.

The volume of supplies, especially – their predictability and timeliness, and the form of financing are, undoubtedly, critically important. Probably, the most comfortable format for everyone would be lend-lease, under which purchases in “military store” are financed automatically, to avoid endless painful manual approvals with inevitable "will provide one day after we collect more internal approvals" for each individual types of weapons and each tranche of deliveries. It would be simpler to provide Ukraine with a menu of available weapons and financial limits and let ZSU decide what and when should be on the battlefield.

But no less important is the possibility to use these weapons against the entire range of military targets that are directly related to the war against Ukraine regardless of where they are located. Why should it matter whether a targeted Russian ammunition depot is located in the territory of the Belgorod region or whether it has already been moved to Luhansk? It is still the same ammunition that will be used to shoot at both Ukrainian servicemembers and civilian facilities in the Ukrainian rear.

Why should it matter where the reserve units of the Russian Armed Forces and their training centers are stationed, on which side of the Ukrainian border they are currently located? All the same, these soldiers will be on the frontline in a short time and will be shooting at ZSU personnel.

Yes, restrictions related to attacks on dual-use facilities (e.g., energy infrastructure) could probably be justified. Although the way Iraq was able to end its eight-year war with Iran – by destroying Iranian oil refineries and tankers – immediately comes to mind. Ukrainian drones, for all their effectiveness, are still mosquito bites compared to the effectiveness of the Iraqi missile attacks of that time.

However, while there may be some discussion about refineries, whether they should be accepted as military targets, the overall restrictions imposed by much of the West on Ukraine seem to me hypocritical and seriously reduce the effectiveness of the weapons provided. They increase the duration of the war, the number of its victims, and generally reduce the probability of victory for Ukraine and therefore its allies, allowing the Kremlin to adapt to attacks by the Ukrainian armed forces.

Step 2. Achieving parity in military production between the West and Russia

The second component is military production. We see how strong is the disproportion between the military production capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex and the military production of the Rammstein coalition (not to mention the military production of Ukraine).

Many say, "let Ukraine finally build its own military production." In fact, Kyiv has done quite a lot to establish military production on its territory. It already produces, for example, a record number of drones (which, as it is easy to see, are quite effective). At the same time, it is simply utopian to establish any significant industrial production of heavier equipment, even just the artillery shells, not to mention the production of explosives for them, in the situation where the nation’s territory is regularly attacked by Russian missiles (and again, there is an artificial ban to respond to these attacks).

So, such demands are hypocritical. But it is quite possible to create (or increase) military production in the U.S. and EU for Ukraine's needs. At the same time, it is possible to solve the problem of adequate rearmament of the NATO countries, which, especially those on the eastern flank of the bloc, are finally starting to feel the real danger they face and want to reinforce.

Such production can be developed by private business. However, the latter needs to be provided with guarantees of long-term demand. And this is what the governments of the concerned countries, including the United States, should do, and for this they have all the financial and budgetary tools, which now are not used at all or are used to a very small degree.

In parallel to the Western military production increase, attacks on the Russian military-industrial complex should not be restricted, but encouraged, to quickly decrease its output. It will also contribute to achieving parity in production levels.

Step 3. Depriving Putinism of access to money and technology

The third component of victory is the economic warfare against the Russian military-industrial complex and the main sources of income that enable the Kremlin to continue the war.

The key tool to achieve this objective is a well-considered sanctions policy. Unfortunately, it should be noted that so far it has been pursued rather inconsistently. In fact, there is no joint international center for imposing and coordinating the implementation of sanctions, no unified intel and research. One that would be common to the countries of the Rammstein coalition and that would monitor war-supporting enterprises in Russia and, accordingly, ensure the imposition of international sanctions on them, as well as control Russia's military-technical cooperation with third countries and their businesses.

The need for international cooperation to track supply chains of both direct military products and dual-use goods into the territory of the Russian Federation is overdue. It is also overdue to track ways of circumventing sanctions, smuggling, and the daily creation of shell companies in different jurisdictions for that matter.

Actions aimed at inducing Western investors to stop paying to the Russian budget and providing the regime with the necessary technologies produce mixed results. That is, the work of pressuring foreign companies to exit Russia has been established by Ukraine and is quite effective; the nation’s “shame list” is subject for negotiations at the highest level. However, without an approved international mechanism of winding down business while protecting the investments made, the exiting firms sell their assets at a bargaining price, thus saving jobs for Russians, keeping production running and taxes paid, and additionally giving Putin something to reward his handmaidens for their loyalty. The clumsy attempt to introduce a price ceiling on oil, from which the Europeans clearly lost while China and India gained, clearly shows that there is a need for a competent international center that would conduct operational modeling of the implementation of sanctions before they are imposed. In fact, only the Yermak-McFaul group is now doing this proactively, but it acts informally and clearly cannot replace such a center.

So far, the West has not been able to achieve even the simplest thing – synchronization of sanctions policy among various countries. Each of them is independently redoing the work of determining what sanctions they deem appropriate; each has its own rules and decision-making process. Too many cooks spoil this broth – we see this daily.

Step 4. Facilitating split of the Russian elites

A separate issue is the effectiveness of sanctions policy on individuals. The current sanctions regime is perceived by many Russians, even opposition minded, as hypocritical.

It is not visible for low-income Russians, which make the main Putin’s constituency.

It is very painful for the low-middle class, especially for those anti-war Russians, who fled the country after the beginning of the hostilities, and who had never any political say. They feel outright betrayed by the West.

It is disturbing for the upper-middle class, which often is the main beneficiary of the war and does a lot of shady proceedings with the state. Disturbing – means they still have access to the West and its infrastructure, just at a higher price. This fact is visible for everyone, and it makes the low-middle class people even angrier, just not at Putin, but at his adversaries.

Finally, the top businessmen are seriously affected, they all are integrated into international markets to a larger or a lesser degree, but they all are pretty much hostage to their domestic assets. Any indication of them being disloyal to Putin, and they will lose their possessions in Russia; and being quite visible in the media, they (and their relatives) can easily be threatened physically. So, they are currently rather trying to hide both from the Kremlin’s and from OFAC oversight.

Uniform pressure on individuals does not achieve much. It is rather converts fragile and soft graphite into a strong and solid diamond. It has to be differentiated and agile: low-middle class folks need to be supported (in return for their direct and open involvement in resisting Putinism), while for their more wealthy and successful peers we need to put most pressure (quite cynically, but we are at war) onto the most Westernized individuals, as they are the weak links within Putinism beneficiaries and are more likely to defect.

But first of all, the world needs to decide for itself what are personal sanctions in their nature. Is it a punishment?

Or is it an act of retaliation? If punishment, why is it carried out without the possibility for the sanctioned people to defend themselves? It goes against the basic principles of justice the Western world is so proud of. And the ambiguity in the understanding of sanctions is already seen by some scandalous decisions of European courts, letting some of Russians oligarchs to go off the hook.

The truth is that individual sanctions are NOT punishment. There is a court of law designed for delivering punishments. Individual sanctions are a way of pressure, a way of inducing this or that representative of the Russian elite (or the elites of other countries), who in one way or another is involved in ensuring and facilitating the conduct of an aggressive war, to make him or her stop supporting the war, help resist this war and neutralize its consequences. Such actions on the part of Western countries do not violate any norms of justice as soon as they do not bear the marks of punishment.

Sanctions should be announced as publicly set conditions imposed by countries in order for an individual to enjoy the benefits of Western civilization: the rule of law, its financial infrastructure, and, finally, to live permanently or temporarily visit the territory of a Western country. Any sovereign power has the right to impose such requirements on any foreign citizen.

The only question is that when such sanctions and requirements are imposed, they must be clearly and transparently defined, and anyone sanctioned must understand what is wanted from him.

Presumption of innocence is not applicable here. Rather wealthy Russians should be approached with a (publicly admitted) presumption of guilt. At the end of the day, they all are the cogs in Putin’s power machine. But the possibility of a settlement deal should also be announced loud and clear – and be the source of the resistance funding. We should (also publicly) announce the objective: the fight against Putin’s aggression should be primarily funded by Russians themselves, and this is the main goal of the sanctions policy.

The solution to this is to expand sanctions to family members, spouses-mistresses-kids-parents, and to the top managers of the large corporations and deputy top officials in the government bodies. They are way more susceptible and can be those cracks that will destroy the system.

Now there are less than ten thousand sanctioned individuals, while one can make a safe bet that the number of direct beneficiaries and operatives of Putin’s regime is no less than a million. And when we perfect the targeting, it is not at all necessary to answer the sanctioned persons the question that Russian oligarchs are very fond of asking: “Why me?” No, no one is obliged to say why. Especially because, in fact, deep down any representative of big Russian business or government knows why. All Russian elites, even most of the current opposition, have in one way or another taken part in the formation of this regime, in its strengthening, in the support of certain “United Russia” deputies, in the “election” of certain officials. They did this, of course, not to fight democracy or to build tyranny. No, their motivation was banal - they were making money in this way, believing that they were playing relatively fairly by the rules of the game that were offered to them by the current Russian regime. But criminal orders remain criminal, and should not be followed, as once was clearly stated in Nuremberg. Fine, let's offer them other rules of the game, which will be their pass to the side of good. But it should be rules that are unambiguously clear and clearly enforced. “Do A, B and C, and you will regain your compliance with international requirements and will be able to get off the sanctions list and return to normal life as honest people.”

This is the only way a split in the Russian elites that will trigger the inner circle resistance will be achieved. Those who are already off the sanctions hook will be envied by those who are still hanging. Those who remain under sanctions will suspect each other of secret negotiations. All of them will be under scrupulous surveillance by Kremlin guards, which, in turn, will create additional nervousness in everybody. In the end, this is the policy that will create the preconditions for the Kremlin's inhabitants to get divided, and force them, out of self-preservation, to act to remove Putin from power.

Step 5. Supporting Russians fighting for change

We come to the next critical component of the victory strategy. Let me emphasize that I firmly believe no country should be in the business of organizing the overthrow of power in another country. But extraordinary situations like a situation of war, of course, are different. The command of the embattled side may well raise the question of destroying the command of the opposing army, including its criminal political leadership. But organizing a statehood after peace is established, organizing the foundations of one's life is, of course, the sovereign right of every nation. Therefore, those who say that the question of regime change in Russia is a matter for Russians themselves, and not for the NATO bloc, or any of its countries, are totally right.

There are some overly radical Russian politicians who call for the occupation of the Russian Federation to build there a different political system. Some even call for forceful dismembering of the country, arguing that it will forever be an autocratic empire otherwise. Many of them are loved in the Western capitals. This is so wrong, and is coming from lack of leadership, or the vision of the required change. But there are forces, who are already working on the future political system of Russia as we speak. One is the recently formed shadow Russian Parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies, which is made of over one hundred legitimately elected former Russian MPs who stood against the war and the violation of the Russian Constitution by Vladimir Putin.

But in order for the Russians to solve this problem, it is necessary to empower them. As experience accumulated over centuries of human history suggests, the political regime that has developed in Russia today will not go away without a fight, in a “velvet”, non-violent way. “Color revolutions” happen when there is an intra-elite competition, and they never challenge the foundation of the political system. In Russia, or in Belarus, to the contrary to Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia or Moldova, the situation is completely different, and would require more profound change by force. Peaceful transition in Russia is possible in the same fashion as power went from Stalin to Khrushchev to Brezhnev – different styles, same system with the same dangers spread globally. And there is no “black swan” Gorbachev in sight.

Instead, there are already six battalions of Russian volunteer units operating in Ukraine today, four of which are part of the Legion “Freedom of Russia”, and one in each of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Siberian Battalion. They are supplemented by even more numerous resistance movements active on the home front. It consists of several independent networks. Together with the freedom fighters at the front, they form the basis of the security apparatus that will determine the shape of future Russia.

The Kremlin realizes the danger that comes from these people, and not only declares them extremists and terrorists, but also toughens the methods of punishment as much as possible in subsequent amendments to already repressive legislation. It is doing all possible work to suppress them, using both police methods inside the country and fomenting public confrontation between the armed part of the Russian opposition – the Russian Resistance – and the supporters of non-violent methods. Putin’s security services, through their agents, are making extensive use of the opposition emigrant media to criticize and discredit armed groups in the eyes of potential supporters, sowing mutual distrust and elevating contradictions between the opposition leaders.

Now the criminal war and wave of terror that Putin himself waged can be used against him as in his favorite judo. He himself did something no one could ever do to him in the past no matter how many human rights abuses – rebranded himself from the President of G8 country into an internationally wanted criminal. The Kremlin has already unleashed a massive bloodshed that is killing hundreds of Russians on the frontline every day, as well as numerous Ukrainians, both military and civilians. Therefore, the use of force against Putin's murderers, their financiers and propagandists, is morally justified, consistent with the internationally recognized norms of warfare, and imperative for victory. Giving Russians a chance to realize the situation and encouraging them to undertake revolutionary action is now no longer an option, but simply a duty of the countries that are part of the Rammstein coalition.

This can only be done under the organizing hand of Ukraine, from Ukrainian territory and with the assistance of Ukrainian military and security services. A force no less powerful than notorious Wagner group but fighting for Free Russia needs to be grown. However, this is not the task of the Ukrainian leadership alone. This is a common task that must be solved jointly, and it is certainly not something Ukraine needs to be restrained from doing, as often is the case today.

Step 6. Creating a political alternative to Putinism

The next component of success is building a positive alternative to Putinism. It is not enough to remove the Russian criminal dictator that is starting wars – it is necessary to mitigate the risks associated to the process of changes. The most obvious scenario of political changes in Moscow is that the current Russian leader is replaced by some other person from his entourage. This person could be better than Putin, or worse.

One may say: “Is there anybody worse? Anyone will be better.”

However, let us remember examples of not so long-ago Soviet history. Stalin was replaced by Khrushchev. As it seemed, not such a tyrant. But this same man, just a few years after coming to power, almost destroyed the entire world during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Not to mention the bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Just like when Stalin himself came to power in the Soviet Union, many people thought it was better than if Trotskiy had been there... This clearly proves to us that it's all about the system, not its individual representatives. Rearrangement of beds in a brothel is not a change. Rather, it is an imitation and, on the contrary, preservation of the regime.

Yes, at some point in time Putin's regime may nominate a figure who will not hold to dictatorship, just as the Soviet system once promoted Gorbachev. Gorbachev, although he did not want to destroy the Soviet Union and was always talking about “a return to socialism with a human face” and the “true ideals” of Vladimir Lenin, was simply too weak a leader and let the reins slip out of his hands. But as a result, when his more fortunate and tenacious colleagues took advantage of the situation, not at all pro-Western and not at all nice and democratic regimes emerged in much of the former Soviet Union. Including Putinism, by the way.

The risk of negative change by the mere replacement of Putin while the same system remains, indeed is quite high. Many representatives of Western bureaucracies conclude that this is why they should not even start thinking of it. However, Putin is mortal, and putting off the problem of an inevitable change of power for several years for later does not cancel the fact that all these risks will still materialize. And it is better to deal with them now, when the war provides an opportunity and justification for building a proactive strategy for democratic change. It is not only necessary to think about the personalities who will be the central actors of change. It is more important to think about the political and legal system that these people are going to build as a result, the mitigation of risks and maximization of benefits associated with their vision, the harmonization of the entire future Russian statehood (or statehoods), including its military machine, security system, border issues, human rights and freedoms, the fate of the peoples currently inhabiting the Russian Federation.

The key issue to discuss and contemplate is the transition period, which will be required to transform the current dictatorship to the desired demilitarized, decentralized, democratic state. This period is extremely important, its parameters should not be determined randomly at the moment of revolutionary events, it should be designed in advance and vetted by the maximum number of players, including opposition politicians, representatives of the Russian peoples, as well as with representatives of the current Russian elites, and leaders of the states that are now in a state of confrontation with Russian Federation as a result of the war unleashed by Putin.

The same aforementioned Congress of People's Deputies could be a platform on which such an agreement can happen, and which can design both the transition period and the basic approaches to the formation of a new Russian statehood. It is already time to converge our heads and start a dialog, to express ideas and put them on paper.

Unfortunately, Russian opposition is unable to unite by itself. Unification usually happens at a final battle; while the endgame is unclear, everybody is competing for resources, influence, voters. And most importantly – for recognition as the leading alternative to Putin. Normally it should be decided by voters, but when there are no elections and even no possibility to return safely to homeland, for many the only source of legitimacy are the international governments.

That is the reason it is futile to wait for the oppositionists to produce something and create a united front. It should be done from the outside, consolidating the competing forces around common strategy, common resource base, common political project. The main criteria for inclusion should be very simple: sharing democratic values, common vision of ending the war with full de-occupation of Ukraine’s territory and compensating the damages, and readiness to act. Ukraine as the country which understands Russia the most, should lead the effort. The very fact of formulating an attractive alternative to Putinism shared by the main players will be a powerful factor that will bring victory closer. One roundtable of the opposition without dominance of one group, one draft of the new Constitution and future legislation, coordinated political campaigns and armed resistance.

It also needs to be stressed that support for such a political alternative does not mean severing all communication channels with the Kremlin. Quite the opposite: the actual political change would only be successful when some of the existing elites were incorporated into the new configuration of power. The opposition stick and the Western carrot is the solution for the smooth and manageable transition when the time comes. The Kremlin already acts under the assumption that the West is managing the opposition and will never close any more doors if their current paranoid fantasies become reality.

Step 7. Dismantling Putinism and stopping the war

It is pretty obvious that Putin is not getting any younger – so the days of the regime are numbered no matter what we do. Putinism will not survive Putin. Russia is no Northern Korea and cannot suppress the distressed society with total control. Elites are too Westernized already and too much motivated by money and a lavish lifestyle. They would be happy to give away significant parts of their fortune to return to business as usual – but such an offer should never appear on the table. Instead, we need to construct and present them with an offer to return to business, but not as usual, but as all civilized nations do.

The future transition should become irrevocably linked to ending this war and assuring the sustainable peace and security for all Russia’s neighbors. We need to eliminate any illusions for both Russian insiders and Western “pragmatists” that it can be achieved with changing Putin to a more moderate figure, or that changes are altogether irrelevant and would be left to a natural flow of things, as Russia should be contained anyway no matter what.

To communicate this approach a coherent and coordinated information campaign is needed, as no victory over the enemy in the XXI century can be achieved without one. And it's not about working with "ordinary Russians" in the remote Siberian hinterlands, where you could spend all the money in the world and achieve very limited result – simply due to the lack of necessary communication tools, which cannot be substituted with the opposition YouTube channels. With these people, it will be necessary to speak frankly and extensively later, after the war ends and the regime changes. The audience of Western radio stations during the Cold War was not the Russian proletariat but the intellectual elites of the country. Only they are capable of linking the actions of the regime to the consequences of the war, to their personal wealth and quality of life.

It is also not only about fighting fakes and disinformation spread globally by Moscow, where there are both victories and defeats (and the most saddening fact is that many did not yet realize that infamous collusion with US elections still continues, just with different technics of more refined propaganda delivered by some recruited Western bloggers and experts embraced by Putin personally).

Ukraine has obviously won the battle for public sympathy (for now, as it may gradually fade). At the same time there is a widespread opinion in the West that “we love Ukraine but still Russia cannot be defeated, that it is too big and a nuclear power,” and that the best that can be hoped for is to make Russia retreat but retreat undefeated. And this is a much more serious problem than the passivity and conformism of many Russians. The position that Ukraine should win the war rather than lose it is, alas, is yet the position of a hawkish (and to me just rationally thinking) minority. And almost no one tries not to talk about the fact that the Ukraine's victory is closely interconnected with the collapse of Putin's regime. Once again like with the missiles – Russia is actively trying to topple Ukraine’s regime and even assassinate Ukraine’s top officials, while Ukraine is denied the right to symmetrically retaliate.

Because of this, the elites inside Russia, who also read the pessimistic New York Times and Washington Post op-eds, are sitting tight and waiting it out. Businesses have moved their accounts and mistresses to the UAE and Indonesia. Government officials, who are well aware of how devastating the war is for the Russian economy, also believe that it is worth waiting and the situation will somehow resolve itself. “Well, even Americans know we can't lose!” they exclaim.

Destroying this stereotype, first of all, inside Russia, and also elsewhere – within the West as well as among Putin’s allies, conveying through all channels of information that not only can Moscow lose, but that it will definitely do so, and that it will never be like before, and that the guilty will be held accountable sooner or later - creating such a conviction will be a powerful weapon, if not nuclear by its importance, then hypersonic at least.

Targeted information would work in the Western societies themselves. People (and bureaucracies) need to be educated about the possibility and necessity of victory, removing the psychological barrier to recognize the fact that it is achievable. It is now the most important tool for strengthening transatlantic unity. It will relieve some of those internal political problems and public opinion deviations, such as those we saw when the financial aid package was negotiated in the U.S. Congress.

The victory starts from the belief that it will happen. Ukrainians are certain in their beliefs and that’s why they are so resilient despite the enormous disparity in the military capability. Skepticism in this situation is not a word of wisdom but help to the aggressor. This war will never stop by itself. Ukraine is no Cyprus to agree to a long-term ceasefire with the loss of control for the large part of its territory after all these deaths and devastation. Minsk agreements were already a failed attempt to freeze the conflict, that nobody in Ukraine wants to repeat. But still we have not so many military options left on the table, and this fact once again is pointing us to the regime change scenario.

Summarizing – stopping the war is equal to terminating Putinism, de-imperialization and de-militarization of Russia, making it a democracy and part of the Western world. There is no middle way with the gradual evolution and relaxation of the regime that can guarantee to avoid future ressentiment and repetition of the aggression.

Conclusion

To win this war we cannot afford just to keep or scale up the existing approach, we need to re-think the fundamental paradigms and derive new strategy. This strategy should go beyond military victory but address broader issues such as political changes in Russia, European security framework, geopolitical competition with China.

What are the key paradigms changes we should consider:

Putin started Ukrainian war to keep his grip on power, it is about internal political affairs, and his geopolitical ambitions are secondary to this. He cannot end the war and survive, even a victory could be fatal for his regime;

The war must end with regime change in Moscow. Anything short to that would be just a temporary ceasefire which would allow to regroup and strike again most likely with larger scale attack;

Modern Russia is not USSR 2.0: there is neither ideology, nor global thinking, strong governing institutions, and even nor gigantic military industrial complex (which they are desperately trying to rebuild). In fact, the country ruled by a gang of aging plutocrats who are not supported neither by general population nor by elites, as Prigozhin’s mutiny has vividly demonstrated;

Strong, bold, and most importantly unpredictable moves could crack the regime. On the contrary, gradually increasing pressure might forge USSR 2.0 from modern Russia, the same way as pressure forges diamond from graphite;

The weakest link of Putin’s regime chain of command are not necessarily the top guys. Deputy ministers and their families are much more vulnerable to the sanctions than big bosses; company CEOs and senior executives are usually more scared of sanctions than the owners. There are over a million direct beneficiaries of the regime, why there are less than one thousand under US sanctions?!

More expensive solutions are not always the most efficient. Disruptive measures can be a true game changer. Small investment to unite and strengthen Russian opposition abroad could do more harm to the regime than hundreds of tanks on the frontline;

Strategy is about making the moves which increases optionality. Putinism should not survive Putin, therefore we need to invest not only in cracking the regime but preparing options for inevitable political transition. Russian political landscape is sterile and without transition plan Russia is at great risk chaos or quickly becoming China’s satellite state.

We, the progressive Russians, want to become the full-fledged part of the Rammstein coalition that is fighting the aggression, and represent the true Free Russia at the table. We ask the West to continue funding and arming Ukraine; we propose to revisit the sanctions policy and to make a clear offer to the Russian elites how they can switch sides and join us; and we call to start working with and supporting those, who are designing the future Russia and fighting for this vision at this very moment.

Humanity has accumulated a great experience of wars. Sooner or later, we will have to win this one. But every day of procrastination means more than a thousand dead soldiers and civilians from both sides of the front line – usually not at all by their own will. While those who sent them are enjoying our slowness and indecision, earning money and political dividends on blood.

It is our duty to deliver them the justice they deserve. This war is not of our making, but victory will be ours!