Under this title, Ukrayinska Pravda has published an article by Ilya Ponomaryov, Chairman of the Congress of People's Deputies, devoted to the role and tasks of Russian resistance to the current regime both at this stage and in the near future. The article is addressed primarily to a Ukrainian audience. Below is the full text of the article in English

To many Ukrainian citizens, the idea of "Russian opposition" brings a smile – sometimes sorrowful, sometimes scornful. The consistent shift of Putin's regime from autocratic to downright totalitarian leaves no space for classic opposition activity. Regrettably, the power that has deteriorated into a terrorist dictatorship does not change at the polls. Therefore, armed resistance remains the only means to challenge putinism.

A few months ago, a large study was published that shows that the scale of political repression in the Russian Federation is greater than it was under the post-Stalin general secretaries. The death of Alexei Navalny, the imprisonment of Ilya Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza, the Kremlin's murders of political opponents abroad, and the dismantling of even the remnants of imitation democracy. These and many other facts have closed on the possibilities of nonviolent resistance in Russia.

Actually, the qualitative growth and intensification of armed resistance to Putin's regime was discussed at the Forum of the Russian Opposition with the participation of Russian volunteers of the AFU, which took place in Lviv at the end of May. The Forum's resolution states that support for Russian volunteers and guerrilla groups fighting against the Kremlin should be the top priority of all – absolutely all! – factions of the Russian opposition, as long as Russia continues its war of conquest against Ukraine. Support can include direct participation in the armed struggle on the front and rear and recruitment, financial, humanitarian, and information assistance.

The Congress of People's Deputies delegation came forward at the Forum with an initiative to create a coordination structure that would support the work of the security forces of those who disagree with the Kremlin. The main goal is to build up the capabilities and influence of the military-political resistance.

You must have seen more than once footage of the aftermath of sabotage on railroads, arson of relay cabinets, military commissaries, and airplanes at airbases in Russia. Drone navigation without the presence of guerrilla groups to strike sites will not be effective enough. The armed underground in Russia does not just exist, but regularly demonstrates its political position in practice, undermining the Kremlin's military and logistical capabilities. It causes serious financial damage, undermining Russian elites' confidence in the regime's stability. And this is what gives reason for cautious optimism.

Incidentally, armed resistance inside the Russian Federation at this stage of historical development is a much safer endeavor than rallies, trips to polling stations, and other familiar formats. Diversionary guerrilla actions a priori imply the necessary level of caution and conspiracy. At the same time, participation in rallies and electoral procedures such as Putin's ‘elections’ means voluntary deanonymization and transferring personal data to intelligence services.

The active core of the Russian resistance at the front and rear currently amounts to about 10,000 people. It would seem that this is not so much. But remember that the Cuban revolution in the 50s of the last century began with only 82 like-minded people...

At the same time, the operations conducted by Russian volunteers, such as the Legion ‘Freedom of Russia’, within the internationally recognized borders of the Russian Federation (Belgorod and Kursk regions), clearly demonstrate the powerlessness of the thesis of ‘inadmissibility / danger of escalation’, which is being circulated by supporters of ‘freezing’ the war and ‘peace at any cost’. They also refute the Kremlin's propaganda about the power of the Russian special services, which have become primarily a political counterintelligence agency.

There is no way for Ukraine to win the war without dismantling putinism as a political system. He was the cause of the aggression, and he must be destroyed. The withdrawal of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to the 1991 borders without a regime change in Moscow is just a shift in the front line. Ukraine's victory on the battlefield-which we all certainly want-will not automatically lead to the fall of the Putin regime. Saddam Hussein, who suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Gulf War (1990-1991) but then held on to power for more than a decade, will not allow you to lie. Neither will Slobodan Milošević, who was overthrown by a ‘Bulldozer Revolution’ (2000), not by losing a series of Balkan conflicts.

This change should be done not by Ukrainians (those oppositionists waiting for Ukrainians to pay for Russia's freedom with their blood are simply immoral in their impotence), but by Russians themselves. But it is impossible to do it without state support now. And sooner or later it will be provided, if not by Ukraine, then by other neighboring countries. These investments are highly effective from the point of view of strategic goals, but also from the point of view of financial return on investment. Ukraine's leadership in this matter is not only a matter of national security, but also of realizing the country's long-term interests after the war in its scenario.

The changes will inevitably include both a purely military (and partisan) aspect and a political one – achieving a split in the Russian elite and mobilizing at least a part of it to fight the authorities. There are no forces of good there, we should have no illusions – but for self-survival, the sanctions stick, and the post-war carrot can be used to push someone into action. Prigozhin's revolt in the summer of 2023 was a vivid manifestation of the deep contradictions within the Kremlin's top brass. The ongoing purges of the Russian generals and the loss of positions by Shoigu and Patrushev are of a similar order. I venture to suggest that these are not the last arrests and personnel "shaking-up’, and a large-scale intra-elite conflict may soon begin, which we should use to our advantage.

The "bulldogs fight under the rug" within the Russian Federation itself is becoming increasingly important, also because the war has long since shifted to an ‘attrition war' format, with no significant changes in the front line over the past year and a half. Western aid to Kyiv, alas, is insufficient to fundamentally change the military situation in the nearest future, and therefore we need access to blocked Russian funds – not only public, but also private.

I can't help but recall that wars that go badly for Russia (and the "special operation" is going badly, no matter how much Putin exhorts that ‘everything is going according to plan’ and ‘we haven't started anything serious yet’) have often resulted in the deepest internal political turmoil. The Russo-Japanese War was followed by the 1905-1907 Revolution, World War I was followed by the 1917 Revolution, and the war in Afghanistan was followed by the collapse of the USSR.

I am sure that during the current war, there will be a window of opportunity when the Russian resistance will be able to seize the levers of state control, eliminate Putin's regime and lead Russia through deimperialization and democratization. Ukraine must be offered a new system of relations based on compliance with international law, return of all internationally recognized territories, compensation, and extradition of war criminals.

Nowadays, the task of the Russian resistance, which we are every day working on, is to increase the number of supporters and the number of direct actions inside Russia. As well as to use every available opportunity to expand military and financial support for the forces of good gathered around a free Ukraine.